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Abstract
We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with
additive utilities, when money transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known to be
the best mechanism for goods under additive utilities and was recently extended to chores by
Bogomolnaia et al. [BMSY17]. For both goods and chores, the rule produces Pareto optimal and
envy-free allocations. In the case of goods, the outcome of the competitive rule can be easily
computed. Competitive allocations solve the Eisenberg-Gale convex program; hence the outcome
is unique and can be approximately found by standard gradient methods. An exact algorithm
that runs in polynomial time in the number of agents and goods was given by Orlin [Orl10].
In the case of chores, the competitive rule does not solve any convex optimization problem;
instead, competitive allocations correspond to local minima, local maxima, and saddle points of
the Nash Social Welfare on the Pareto frontier of the set of feasible utilities. The rule becomes
multivalued and none of the standard methods can be applied to compute its outcome.
In this paper, we show that all the outcomes of the competitive rule for chores can be
computed in strongly polynomial time if either the number of agents or the number of chores is
fixed. The approach is based on a combination of three ideas: all consumption graphs of Pareto
optimal allocations can be listed in polynomial time; for a given consumption graph, a candidate
for a competitive allocation can be constructed via explicit formula; and a given allocation can be
checked for being competitive using a maximum flow computation as in Devanur et al. [DPSV02].
Our algorithm immediately gives an approximately-fair allocation of indivisible chores by
the rounding technique of Barman and Krishnamurthy [BK19].
1 Introduction
The competitive equilibrium notion, also known as market or Walrasian equilibrium, is a key
economic concept that models the allocation of resources at the steady state of an economy when
supply equals demand. The economic theory of general equilibrium originated from the ideas of
Walras [Wal74] and became mathematically rigorous since the work of Arrow-Debreu [AD54], who
proved existence of equilibrium under mild conditions.
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Our work is motivated by applications of competitive equilibrium to the problem of fair alloca-
tion of resources among agents with different tastes, when monetary compensations are not allowed.
This extremely fruitful connection between the theory of general equilibrium and economic design
was pioneered by Varian [Var74]. The idea was to give each agent a unit amount of “virtual” money
and equalize demand and supply: find prices and an allocation such that when each agent spends
her money on the most preferred bundles she can afford, all the resources are bought and all the
money is spent. This rule is called the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) or the
the competitive rule.
The resulting allocation has the remarkable fairness property of envy-freeness, since all the
agents have equal budgets and select their most preferred bundles, and is Pareto optimal.1 Due
to its desirable properties, the competitive rule has been suggested as a mechanism for allocating
goods in real markets, with applications ranging from cloud computing [DGM+18] and dividing
rent [GP15] to assigning courses among university students [Bud11].
The market considered by Varian is known in the computer science literature as the Fisher
market (named after Irving Fisher, the 18th century economist, see [BS00]). The properties of
the Fisher market were studied in an extensive body of literature discovering both algorithms for
computing equilibria and hardness results (see, e.g., [EG59] and Chapter 5 of [NRTV07]).
For allocating goods, the Fisher market has beautiful structural properties. For a large class
of utilities2, the equilibria of the Fisher market are captured by the Eisenberg-Gale convex pro-
gram [EG59], which maximizes the product of individual utilities3. By the convexity of this problem,
the competitive rule is single valued (i.e. the utilities are unique) and can be computed efficiently
for important classes of preferences, such as given by additive utilities, using standard gradient
descent methods.
Allocation of Bads (Chores). The literature on resource allocation has largely neglected the
study of bads, also known as chores, which are items that the agents do not want to consume, such
as doing housework, or that represent liabilities, such as owing a good to someone.
While at first sight, the same principles should apply in the problem of allocating chores as
when allocating goods, it turns out that the problem of allocating chores is more complex. The
competitive rule for chores was defined and studied in a sequence of papers [BMSY17, BMSY18]
that considered the analog of Fisher markets for chores and analyzed their properties. Even in the
case of additive utilities, the competitive rule for chores is no longer single valued, the equilibrium
allocations form a disconnected set, and can be obtained as critical points of the Nash social welfare
on the Pareto frontier of the set of feasible utilities [BMSY17]. The problem of allocating chores is
thus not convex and the usual techniques for finding competitive allocations based on linear/convex
programming such as primal/dual, ellipsoid, and interior point methods, do not apply.
The existing work on the competitive allocation of chores [BMSY17, BMSY18] left open the
question of computing competitive allocations for more than two agents with additive utilities4,
1An allocation is Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation in which all the agents are at least as happy and
at least one agent is strictly happier.
2Homogeneity and convexity of utilities are enough.
3The product of utilities is known as the Nash product or the Nash social welfare from the axiomatic theory of
bargaining [Nas50]. Beyond the Fisher market, it balances the individual happiness and collective well-being in many
different problems, e.g., [CKM+16a, CFS17].
4For two agents, a simple procedure for finding competitive allocations is described in [BMSY18]. It uses the
one-dimensional structure of Pareto optimal allocations, which can be ordered from allocations preferred by the first
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which we address in this paper.
Our Contribution. We study the problem of allocating chores in the basic setting of additive
utilities. We have a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of agents and a set [m] = {1, . . . ,m} of divisible chores
(which may alternatively be seen as indivisible chores that can be allocated in a randomized way).
The utilities of the agents are given by a matrix v ∈ Rn×m<0 such that vi,j is the (negative) value of
agent i for chore j. Allocations are defined in the usual way and the utilities are additive over the
allocations.
We allow agents to have different budgets represented by a vector b ∈ Rn<0, which can be seen
as virtual currency for acquiring chores; in particular, the budget of an agent denotes how much
of a “duty” that agent has5. For example, if an agent works full time while another agent only
works half of the time, then this can be modeled with budgets −1 and −0.5, respectively. Note the
budgets are negative to indicate that they represent a liability.
Our main result states that:
Finding all the outcomes of the competitive rule is a computationally tractable problem
when either the number of agents or the number of chores is bounded. In particular, our algorithm
runs in strongly polynomial time.
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem, Divisible Chores). Consider any chore division problem (v,b)
with n agents and m chores, where v ∈ Rn×m<0 is a matrix of values and b ∈ Rn<0 a vector of budgets.
If n or m is fixed, then
• the set of all competitive utility profiles
• a set of competitive allocations and price vectors such that for any competitive utility profile
there is an allocation with this utility profile in the set
can be computed using O
(
m
n(n−1)
2
+3
)
operations, if n is fixed, or O
(
n
m(m−1)
2
+3
)
, for fixed m. This
gives an algorithm that runs in strongly polynomial time.
Remarks. Getting access to the whole equilibrium set in polynomial time is crucial for fair
division applications, where having the whole set of equilibria allows one to reason about which
outcome to pick for a given instance and to decide on the tradeoffs between different properties,
such as maximizing welfare, individual fairness guarantees, etc., among which there may be tension.
Since different equilibria favor different agents there is a question of picking the best outcome among
the set of all equilibria. Bogomolnaia et al. [BMSY17] suggested picking the median equilibrium
(with probability 1 there is an odd number of equilibria) in case of two agents. The chance that
such a selection can be computed without finding the whole set seems negligible. Alternatively, one
can select the most egalitarian equilibrium or ask the agents to vote which equilibrium to select.
agent to preferred by the second: a specific feature of the two-agent case.
5Most of the literature on fair division assumes that agents are equal in their rights, the case captured by equal
budgets. It turns out that allowing unequal budgets is convenient even if in our problem agents have equal rights:
see agent-item duality in Section 4 or budget-rounding in Section 7.
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Our method and existing techniques. The basic difficulty for allocating chores is that the
competitive rule has disconnected equilibria. The only known approach for finding disconnected
equilibria was applied to goods [DK08, AJKT17] and uses a complex tool from computational
algebraic geometry (see, e.g., the work on cell enumeration in [BPR98] and [SED07, JPS10] for
probabilistic algorithms) in order to reduce the search space to a polynomial number of structures.
Our algorithm provides the first explicit construction (without cell enumeration) and thus an-
swers an open problem of [DK08]. Our construction has clear economic meaning: the Pareto frontier
can be computed by enumerating its faces (or equivalently Pareto optimal demand structures) in
polynomial time.
The idea used to compute the Pareto frontier is to recover that of an n-agent problem from
its projections to two-agent sub-problems. We use a few other novel tricks: an agent-item duality
to cover both cases of finite n and m (note that the work of [DK08] needs two separate proofs),
explicit formulas for recovering the competitive utility profile if the demand structure is known,
and new structural results for the set of Pareto optimal allocations. We believe that our approach
is applicable to other disconnected economies.
Overview of the algorithm . Our main theorem is based on the following observation: com-
puting competitive allocations for chores becomes easy if the Pareto frontier is known. Then every
face of the frontier is easy to check for containing a competitive allocation and the intuition comes
from numerical methods: the solution to a constrained optimization problem is easy to find if we
know the set of active constraints. We show that for a competitive division of chores, the Pareto
frontier can be computed in polynomial time in the number of items m for a fixed number of agents
n or in polynomial time in n for fixed m. This implies a polynomial algorithm for computing all
competitive utility profiles.
Faces of the Pareto frontier are encoded using the language of consumption graphs. The con-
sumption graph of an allocation is obtained by tracing an edge between an agent and a chore
whenever the agent consumes some fraction of that chore. Then the first step of the algorithm is
to generate a so called “rich” family of graphs, which contains consumption graphs of all Pareto
optimal allocations6. Such a family contains a graph for each competitive allocation in addition to
possibly containing other graphs that do not correspond to competitive allocations. In the second
step, we generate a “candidate” utility profile for each graph in the family by recovering the ex-
plicit formula for the utility assuming that the given graph is a consumption graph of a competitive
allocation. In the third step, we adapt the technique from [DPSV02] to check if the utility profile
considered is in fact competitive by studying the amount of flow in an auxiliary maximum flow
problem.
Indivisible chores. Finally, we also show how to find approximately fair allocations for indi-
visible chores in polynomial time, for fairness notions such as weighted envy-freeness and weighted
proportionality. For indivisible chores, the corresponding relaxations of these fairness notions are
weighted envy-freeness up to removal of a chore from a bundle and addition of another chore to
another bundle (weighted-EF11) and weighted proportionality up to one chore (weighted-Prop1).
These results become an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 and the technique from the recent
work [BK19] that showed how to round a divisible competitive allocation with goods in order to
get an approximately fair and Pareto optimal indivisible allocation.
6For non-degenerate v (all matrices except a subset of measure zero) the set of all “Pareto optimal” consumption
graphs has polynomial size. In order to capture the degenerate case we are forced to define a rich set in a more
complex way.
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To the best of our knowledge, no algorithms for the approximately-fair and efficient allocation
of indivisible chores were known.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 formalizes the model and defines the competitive rule
and its properties. In Section 3 we give the main theorem and describe the main phases of the
algorithm. In Section 4 we study the Pareto frontier and show how to compute a rich family of
allocation graphs. In Section 5 we obtain explicit formulas for competitive utility profiles when
the consumption graph is known. In Section 6 we check that a given utility profile is competitive,
recovering an allocation and prices. We conclude with Section 7, which shows how to obtain
approximately fair allocations for indivisible chores.
1.1 Related Work
Algorithmic results for goods. The problem of finding polynomial time algorithms for objects
defined non-constructively has been a major research focus in the algorithmic game theory literature
and beyond [Pap94]. Positive results were obtained for important special cases, such as computing
Nash equilibria in zero-sum games and competitive equilibria in exchange economies with additive
utilities, as well as negative (hardness) results for the corresponding problems in general-sum games
and economies with non-additive utilities.
The case of “convex” economies: In particular, the search for algorithms for computing
competitive equilibria has brought a flurry of efficient algorithms for finding equilibria in diverse
market scenarios (see, e.g., primal-dual type algorithms in [DPSV02, CDSY04], network flow type
algorithms in [Orl10, Ve´g12b, Ve´g12a], convex programming formulations for Fisher markets and
their extensions such as Eisenberg-Gale markets [CV04, CMPV05, JVY05, Jai07], auction-based
algorithms in [GKV04]) as well as computational hardness results (see, e.g. [CSVY06, CDDT09,
EY10, GMVY17]).
The polynomial time algorithms in these works are designed for economies that satisfy implicit
or explicit convexity assumptions. For example, in the case of Fisher markets, the competitive
equilibrium solves the Eisenberg-Gale convex program [EG59] for a large class of utilities, maxi-
mizing the Nash product (i.e., the geometric mean of the utilities weighted by the budgets of the
agents). Moreover, the equilibrium is unique, robust [MV07] (i.e., small errors in the observa-
tion of the market parameters do not change the competitive allocation by much), and admits
polynomial time approximation algorithms based on gradient descent methods as well as exact
algorithms (see, e.g., Chapters 5 and 6 in [NRTV07]). In contrast, in the case of chores, there is
a multiplicity of equilibria and no robustness guarantee: the set of equilibria admits no continuous
selections [BMSY17].
Dynamic processes in markets have also been studied, such as tatonement (see, e.g., [CCD13] for
a general class of markets containing Eisenberg-Gale markets), and proportional response dynamics
in Fisher markets [Zha09, BDX11, WZ07] and production markets [BMN18].
Non-convex economies and disconnected sets of equilibria: None of the methods
mentioned above are applicable to the situation when the competitive equilibria form a disconnected
set, that is, when the competitive rule becomes multivalued (as in the case of chores). This
situation corresponds to constrained economies, such as when preferences are satiated or there are
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some constraints on individual consumption7. In the economic literature it is known that for such
economies the competitive correspondence may become multivalued (see, e.g., [Gje96]), which was
observed to be problematic from the point of view of finding competitive equilibria; for example,
in [Ve´g12a] polynomial time algorithms are not obtained precisely in cases where economies admit
multiple disconnected equilibria.
There are very few examples of efficient algorithms for computing competitive equilibria for non-
convex economies. In [DGM+18], a polynomial time algorithm is given for markets with covering
constraints, where the utilities are satiated but the equilibria form a connected, yet non-convex set.
The work of [DK08] gives a polynomial time algorithm for computing competitive equilibria when
either the number of agents or goods is fixed based on the cell enumeration technique. The work
of [AJKT17] extends the approach of [DK08] to the fair assignment problem of [HZ79]: there the
utilities are piecewise-linear concave functions, but are neither separable nor monotone, and do not
satisfy gross substitutability; their study also gives a polynomial time algorithm when either the
number of agents or the number of goods is fixed.
Fair division of an inhomogeneous chore. Allocation of chores also appears in works on fair
cake-cutting (dividing a divisible inhomogeneous resource). This literature typically ignores Pareto
optimality focusing exclusively on fairness.
Examples of chore division in this line of work include the fair chore division model posed
by [Gar78], which can be seen as identical to the cake cutting problem except that the item
to be partitioned is a heterogeneous bad. Peterson and Su [PS02, PS98] design envy-free chore
division protocols. These protocols were improved by [DFHY18], who obtained a bounded envy-
free chore division method for any number of agents. [HvS15] consider the fair division of chores
with connected pieces and bound the loss in social welfare due to fairness. [SH18] studies the envy-
free division of a cake when some parts have been burned in the oven (i.e., the value densities can be
positive, negative, or zero anywhere) and showed the existence of connected envy-free allocations
for three players using a topological approach based on an analog of Sperner’s lemma. In a follow-
up work, [MZ18] show the existence of connected envy-free allocations when the number of players
is a prime or equal to four.
Relaxed fairness notions for indivisible items. The literature on fair division of indivisible
goods has studied several fairness notions, such as envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) [LMMS04],
proportionality up to one good (Prop1), envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), max-min fair share
[Bud11], and (approximate) competitive equilibrium. Envy-freeness up to one good roughly means
that no agent i envies the bundle of another agent j after the best item has been dropped from
j’s bundle. Proportionality up to one good is similarly defined. These two fairness notions can
be miraculously obtained by maximizing the Nash social welfare, which also guarantees Pareto
optimality [CKM+16b]. It is open whether or not EFX allocations always exist (see, e.g., [PR18]).
The max-min fair share is a fairness notion inspired from cake cutting protocols and requires that
each agent gets a value at least as high as the one he can guarantee by preparing first n bundles and
letting the other players choose the best n−1 of these bundles. This optimization problem induces
a max-min value αi for each player and the question is whether there exists an allocation where
each agent has utility at least αi. While such allocations may not exist [PW14], approximations
7Note that an economy with chores can be reduced to a constrained economy with goods, see [BMSY17] and
Section 8
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are possible; in particular, there always exists an allocation in which all the agents get two thirds
of their max-min value [PW14], and this can be computed in polynomial time [AMNS15].
[ARSW17] study the fair allocation of multiple indivisible chores using the max-min share
solution concept, showing that such allocations do not always exist and computing one (if it exists)
is strongly NP-hard; these findings are complemented by a polynomial 2-approximation algorithm.
[ACI18] consider the problem of fair allocation of a mixture of goods and chores and design several
algorithms for finding fair (but not necessarily Pareto optimal) allocations in this setting. [ALW19]
consider mechanisms robust to strategic manipulations.
Finally, the competitive rule and various relaxations (such as those obtained by removing the
budget clearing requirement, allowing item bundling, or using randomization) can also be used to
allocate indivisible goods. These have been studied for various classes of utilities from the point
of view of existence of fair solutions and their computation in [Bud11, FGL13, BHM15, OPR16,
BLM16, BK19, BNTC19]. Closest to ours is the work by [BK19], which considers Fisher markets
with indivisible goods and shows how to compute an allocation that is Prop1 and Pareto optimal
in strongly polynomial time. We build on these results to obtain a theorem for chores.
2 Preliminaries
There is a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of agents and a set [m] = {1, . . . ,m} of divisible non-disposable
chores (bads) to be distributed among the agents.
A bundle of chores is given by a vector x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm+ , where xj represents the amount
of chore j in the bundle8. W.l.o.g., there is one unit of each chore.9 An allocation z = (zi)i∈[n] is
a set of bundles where agent i receives bundle zi and all the chores are distributed:
∑n
i=1 zi,j = 1
for each j ∈ [m].
The agents have additive utilities specified through a matrix v ∈ Rn×m<0 , where10 vi,j < 0 repre-
sents the value of agent i for consuming one unit of chore j. The utility of agent i in an allocation
z is ui(zi) =
∑m
j=1 vi,j · zi,j . The vector of utilities at an allocation z is u(z) = (u1(z1), . . . , un(zn)).
The set of all allocations will be denoted by A and the set of all feasible utility profiles by
U(v). These are utilities for which there exists an allocation in which the utilities are realized, i.e.,
U(v) = {w ∈ Rn | ∃ z ∈ A : w = u(z)}. We note that both the set of all allocations—A—and the
set of feasible utility profiles—U(v)—are convex polytopes.
In general, the agents may have different duties with respect to the chores, which we will model
through different (negative) budgets. Formally, each agent i will be endowed with a budget bi < 0.
For example, a situation where the problem of allocating chores with unequal budgets may arise is
when a manager assigns tasks to two workers, Alice and Bob. If Alice works full time while Bob
works part time (say 50%), then it is reasonable that Bob has the right to work half as much than
as his colleague Alice. This corresponds to budgets bAlice = −1 and bBob = −2.
8Another interpretation of an amount xj of good j is the amount of time doing the chore j or the probability of
getting it.
9Given an arbitrary division problem, one can rescale the utilities to obtain an equivalent problem where the
total amount of each chore is one unit.
10We write R+,R>0,R−,R<0 for vectors with non-negative, strictly-positive, non-positive, and strictly negative
components, respectively; to distinguish vectors and scalars bold font is used.
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Definition 2. A chore division problem (v,b) is a pair of a matrix of values v ∈ Rn×m<0 and budgets
b ∈ Rn<0.
2.1 The Competitive Rule
Given a vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Rm<0, where pj represents the price of a chore j, the price of a
bundle x = (x1, . . . , xm) of chores is given by p(x) =
∑m
j=1 pj · xj .
Definition 3 (Competitive Allocation). An allocation z = (z1, . . . , zn) for a chore division problem
(v,b) with strictly negative matrix of values and budgets is competitive if and only if there exists
a vector of prices p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Rm<0 such that for each i ∈ [n]:
• Agent i’s bundle maximizes its utility among all bundles within its budget: ui(zi) ≥ ui(x), for
each bundle x with p(x) ≤ bi.
Unlike the Fisher market framework for allocating goods, in the case of chores, all the prices
and budgets are negative. We also note that Definition 3 is designed for chores that have strictly
negative value for all the agents. Chores for which some agents have value zero can be handled
separately as follows.
Remark 4 (Chores with Zero Utilities). Suppose there exists at least one chore j ∈ [m] for which
some agent i has utility zero. Let S = {j ∈ [m] | ∃i ∈ [n] s.t. vi,j = 0} be the set of such chores.
Then each chore in S can be allocated to an agent that is indifferent to it while not affecting
the utility of any agent. Moreover, this allocation can be implemented through the competitive
rule by setting the price of each chore j ∈ S to zero.
For a given matrix v of values and vector b of budgets, we denote the set of all competitive
allocations by CA(v,b) and the set of all competitive utility profiles by CU(v,b), where we have
CU(v,b) = {u(z) | z ∈ CA(v,b))}.
Definition 5 (Pareto Optimality). An allocation z is Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation
z′ in which ui(z′i) ≥ ui(zi) for every agent i ∈ [n] and the inequality is strict for at least one agent.
Definition 6 (Weighted Envy-Freeness). An allocation z is weighted-envy-free with weights β ∈
Rn>0 if for every pair of agents i, i′ ∈ [n], the following inequality holds: ui(zi)βi ≥
ui(zi′ )
βi′
.
We denote by A∗(v) and U∗(v) the set of all Pareto optimal allocations and corresponding
utility profiles, respectively.
The competitive rule satisfies both Pareto optimality and weighted-envy-freeness with weights
βi = |bi|. Weighted-envy-freeness holds since agent i can afford a fraction of |bi|/|bj | from the
bundle of any agent j. For Pareto optimality, see Theorem 9.
Geometry of the Competitive Rule and Non-convexity. In the case of goods, the compet-
itive rule can be implemented via the Eisenberg-Gale optimization problem (see, e.g., Chapter 5 in
[NRTV07]): an allocation z is competitive if and only if the product of utilities at z weighted by
the budgets is maximized. That is, the product
∏n
i=1 |ui(zi)||bi| is maximized, where the maximum
is taken over all feasible allocations z. This problem has a convex programming formulation and
can be solved efficiently using standard gradient descent methods.
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The product Nb(u) =
∏n
i=1 |ui||bi| is known as the Nash product or the Nash social welfare.
In the case of chores, an analogue of the Eisenberg-Gale characterization was found in [BMSY17].
Theorem 7 (Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskiy, Yanovskaya [BMSY17]). Consider a chore di-
vision problem (v,b). A feasible allocation z is competitive if and only if the utility profile u(z)
• belongs to the set U∗(v) ∩ Rn<0 of strictly negative points on the Pareto frontier, and
• is a critical point of the Nash product Nb on the feasible set of utilities U(v).
Recall that a point x is called critical for a smooth function f on a convex set K if the tangent
hyperplane to the level curve of f at x is a supporting hyperplane for K. Local maxima, local
minima, and saddle points of f on the boundary of K are examples of critical points.
In [BMSY17], the theorem is proved for the case of equal budgets, but the same proof works
for arbitrary strictly negative budgets. A sketch of the proof is contained in the Appendix (see
Proposition 46 together with other characterizations of competitive allocations).
Remark 8. We note that none of the global extrema of the Nash product are competitive: global
minima correspond to unfair allocations, where at least one agent receives no chores and hence the
Nash product at such allocations is zero; the global maximum lies on the anti-Pareto frontier and
therefore it is not Pareto optimal. Thus, it is unclear how to use global optimization methods to
compute the outcome of the competitive rule.
Example 1. Two agents are dividing two chores and values are given by
v =
( −1 −8
−1 −2
)
;
rows correspond to agents and columns to chores. Both agents hate the second chore but the
second agent finds it less painful compared to the first chore than agent 1 . Assume that budgets
are b = (−1,−2) (i.e., the second agent is entitled to twice as much work as agent 1). Elementary
computations show that there are two competitive allocations
z1 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
with prices p1 = (−1,−2) and z2 =
(
1 14
0 34
)
with p2 =
(
−1
3
,−8
3
)
.
These allocations are weighted-envy free: agent 1 prefers his allocation to 12 of the allocation of the
second agent, while agent 2 thinks that his bundle is better than the doubled bundle of agent 1.
The feasible set U(v) and utility profiles of the two competitive allocations are depicted in
Figure 1 together with the level curves of the Nash product |u1| · |u2|2. We see that the level curves
of the Nash product (dotted hyperbolas) and the feasible set are not separated by a straight line
and thus the competitive allocations are not global extrema of the Nash product: the utility profile
u(z2) is the local maximum of the product on the Pareto frontier while the corner of the feasible
set, u(z1), is a stationary point: neither local minimum nor maximum.
This example illustrates that the problem of computing competitive allocations is non-convex ;
there can be many competitive utility profiles, and in particular the set of competitive allocations
can be disconnected.
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Figure 1: Competitive utility profiles (blue dots) for Example 1. The corner corresponds to z1 and
the profile inside the face is u(z2).
2.2 Corollaries of Geometric Characterization. Existence and Welfare Theo-
rems
Theorem 7 does not give any recipe for computing outcomes of the competitive rule but allows
one to analyze its properties. The first corollary of Theorem 7 is the existence of competitive
allocations. Indeed, there is at least one critical point of Nb on the Pareto frontier: the one where
the level curve of Nb, given by the equation
{
u ∈ Rn<0 : Nb(u) = C
}
, first touches the Pareto
frontier, when we decrease C from large to small values. The corresponding competitive allocation
maximizes the Nash product over all Pareto optimal allocations (see [BMSY17] for details of the
construction).
The second corollary of Theorem 7 is that both welfare theorems hold.
Theorem 9 (Welfare Theorems). The first and the second welfare theorems hold:
1. Any competitive allocation is Pareto optimal;
2. For any Pareto optimal allocation z at which the utilities are strictly negative, there exist
budgets b ∈ Rn<0 such that z is competitive with respect to b.
Proof. By Theorem 7, the utility profile of a competitive allocation belongs to U∗, which yields the
first item. To prove the second one, note that since U is a convex polytope and u(z) belongs to its
boundary, we can trace a hyperplane h supporting U at u(z). By Theorem 7, it is enough to show
that there is a vector of budgets b, such that h is a tangent hyperplane to the level curve of Nb at
u(z). This condition is satisfied if the gradient of ln(Nb) is orthogonal to h at u. The gradient is
(|bi|/|ui(zi)|)i∈[n]. If h is given by the equation {V : 〈τ, V 〉 = C}, the vector τ is orthogonal to h
and thus it is enough to select bi = −|τi| · |ui(zi)|.
A third corollary of Theorem 7 is that whether a given allocation is competitive or not can be
determined by its utility profile.
Corollary 10 (Pareto-indifference). Let (v,b) be a chore division instance. If z is a competitive
allocation and z′ is another feasible allocation with the same utility profile (that is, u(z) = u(z′)),
then z′ is also a competitive allocation for (v,b).
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3 Computing the Competitive Rule for Chores
In this section we formulate the main algorithmic result of the paper, discuss its implications and
limitations, and present a high-level overview of the algorithm.
Our main result states that finding all the outcomes of the competitive rule is a computationally
tractable problem when either the number of agents or the number of chores is bounded. Our
algorithm runs in strongly polynomial time.
Theorem 11. Suppose one of the parameters, the number of agents n or the number of chores m,
is fixed. Then for any tuple (v,b), where v ∈ Rn×m<0 is a matrix of values and b ∈ Rn<0 a vector of
budgets,
• the set CU(v,b) of all competitive utility profiles
• a set of pairs (z,p) such that the allocation z is competitive with the price vector p and for
any u ∈ CU(v,b) there is a pair such that u(z) = u
can be computed using O
(
m
n(n−1)
2
+3
)
operations, if n is fixed, or O
(
n
m(m−1)
2
+3
)
, for fixed m. This
gives an algorithm that runs in strongly polynomial time.11
What if both n and m are large? Theorem 11 cannot be improved when both n and m are
large. It is known [BMSY18] that the number of competitive utility profiles can be as large as
2min{n,m} − 1; thus even listing all competitive utility profiles can take exponential time if both n
and m are large.
Theorem 11 implies that for bounded n or m, the number of competitive utility profiles is at
most polynomial in the free parameter, which is itself an interesting complement to the exponential
lower bound from [BMSY18]. As a byproduct of the construction, we get explicit upper bounds (a
combination of Corollary 25 and 29 below).
Corollary 12. The number of competitive utility profiles is at most
min
{
(2m+ 1)
n(n−1)
2 , (2n+ 1)
m(m−1)
2
}
.
However the exponential multiplicity of competitive allocations does not prohibit the existence
of an algorithm that finds one competitive allocation in polynomial time when both n and m are
large.
Open problem. Is it possible to compute one competitive utility profile in time polynomial in n+m?
If such an algorithm exists, it will give a “computational” answer to the “economic” question posed
in [BMSY17]: finding a single-valued selection of the competitive rule with attractive properties.
11Such an algorithm makes a polynomial (in n or m, depending on which of the parameters is fixed) number of
elementary operations (multiplication, addition, comparison, etc). If the input of the problem (v and b) consists
of rational numbers in binary representation, then the amount of memory used by the algorithm is bounded by a
polynomial in the length of the input. For basics of complexity theory, see [AB07].
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Computing All Competitive Allocations Theorem 11 ensures that all competitive utility
profiles will be enumerated but does not guarantee finding all the allocations for each such utility
profile. It turns out that here the result cannot be improved without restricting the class of
preferences.
In Subsection 6.3, we define the class of non-degenerate matrices of values v that contain all
the matrices except those that satisfy certain algebraic equations. In particular, a random matrix
with respect to any continuous measure on Rn×m− is non-degenerate with probability 1.
In the case of non-degenerate instances, for each Pareto optimal utility profile u, there is
exactly one feasible allocation z with u = u(z) (see Subsection 6.3) and therefore the algorithm
from Theorem 11 outputs all competitive allocations.
However, for degenerate problems, the set Zu of all feasible allocations z with u(z) = u can
be a polytope with an exponential number of vertices even if n or m are fixed and therefore, for
general problems, there is no hope of listing even all the extreme points of the set of competitive
allocations with given u(z) = u (see Example 2).
3.1 The algorithm
Here we describe the main ideas and the general structure of the algorithm from Theorem 11. The
ideas are then developed in subsequent sections.
Consumption Graphs and Rich Families For a feasible allocation z, we associate the con-
sumption graph Gz. This is a non-oriented bipartite graph with parts [n] and [m], where an agent
i ∈ [n] and a chore j ∈ [m] are connected by an edge if and only if zi,j > 0.
The algorithm is inspired by two observations developed in Sections 5 and 6 respectively:
• a competitive utility profile can be recovered via explicit formulas if we know the consumption
graph of a corresponding competitive allocation, but do not know the allocation itself.
• a utility profile can be efficiently checked for competitiveness; an allocation and price vector
are obtained as a byproduct.
Definition 13 (Rich family of graphs). Consider a chore division instance (v,b). A family of
bipartite graphs G is called rich if for any competitive utility profile u ∈ CU(v,b) there is a com-
petitive allocation z with u(z) = u such that the consumption graph Gz belongs to the family G.
3.1.1 How the algorithm works
The algorithm consists of three phases:
Phase 1: Generate a rich family of graphs G (Section 4): If either n or m is fixed, then the set of
“maximal weighted welfare” (MWW) graphs12 is rich and can be enumerated in polynomial
time.
Phase 2: Compute a “candidate” utility profile for each graph from G (Section 5): For all G ∈ G
we apply the formula from Proposition (32) as if we know that G is a consumption graph of
some competitive allocation z. As a result, we get a “candidate” profile u which is
12The set of maximal weighted welfare graphs is formally defined in Section 4.
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• a competitive utility profile u = u(z) if there exists a competitive allocation z such that
Gz = G
• some vector from Rn<0 (not necessary feasible), if no competitive allocation has G as the
consumption graph.
Phase 3: Check each “candidate” profile u for competitiveness (Section 6): A utility profile u
is competitive if there is a flow of a large enough magnitude in an auxiliary maximum flow
problem. For competitive u a maximum flow gives a competitive allocation z with u = u(z)
and the corresponding vector of prices can be constructed using explicit formulas (Lemma 45).
3.1.2 Rich family of graphs as a parameterization of the Pareto frontier
Generating a rich family of graphs is the most important part of the algorithm and also its com-
plexity bottleneck. Indeed, during the second phase, the algorithm cycles over graphs G ∈ G and
thus the size of the family G determines the number of iterations (each of which takes polynomial
time) and hence the running time.
We get the following trade-off: family G must be rich enough to discover all competitive profiles,
but be computable in polynomial time (in particular it must contain at most a polynomial number
of graphs).
Example. The set of all bipartite graphs with parts [n] and [m] is rich, but contains an exponential
number of elements and thus leads to an exponential-time algorithm. This exponential algorithm
is easier to implement and for small division problems (say, three agents and five chores) it is a
reasonable choice to use.
The insight for a smaller rich family comes from the First Welfare Theorem (Theorem 9):
the set of consumption graphs of all efficient allocations is clearly rich. However, for degenerate
problems, this set can have exponential size; see Example 2, where the set of consumption graphs
corresponding to one particular Pareto optimal utility profile U contains an exponential number of
elements.
We modify this idea by considering a set MWW(v) of maximal weighted welfare (MWW) graphs
(defined in Section 4). This set of graphs, closely related to maximal bang per buck (MBB) graphs
(see, e.g., [NRTV07, DPSV02] and Subsection 4.4), encodes faces of the Pareto frontier (Lemma 17).
The set MWW(v) has polynomial size and can be computed in polynomial time even for
degenerate problems, if one of parameters n or m is fixed. Computing MWW(v) can be interpreted
as computing the Pareto frontier itself and thus is of independent interest.
3.1.3 Runtime
The size of a rich set of graphs G and the time needed to compute it determine the time complexity
of the algorithm. Indeed, by Corollaries 33 and 37, the number of operations needed for the last
two phases of the algorithm is bounded by |G| · (O(nm(n+m))+O(n2m2(n+m))).
In Section 4, we construct a superset G of MWW(v) with |G| bounded both by (2m+ 1)n(n−1)2
and by (2n+ 1)
m(m−1)
2 . We show that G can be computed in O(mn(n−1)2 +1) operations for fixed n
or in O
(
n
m(m−1)
2
+1
)
for fixed m (see Proposition 23 for fixed n and Subsection 4.4 for fixed m).
Thus the whole algorithm runs in polynomial time and the number of operations is bounded by
O
(
m
n(n−1)
2
+3
)
for fixed n or by O
(
n
m(m−1)
2
+3
)
for fixed m.
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4 Geometry of the Pareto frontier. Computing rich families of
bipartite graphs.
A rich family of graphs represents possible demand structures for competitive allocations and is
the main ingredient for finding competitive utility profiles. The goal of this section is to construct
an algorithm for enumerating a rich family of graphs in polynomial time if either n or m is fixed.
We define the family of maximal weighted welfare (MWW) graphs which encode faces of the
Pareto frontier, show that it is rich, and construct a polynomial algorithm enumerating a superset
of all such graphs.
We begin with several useful characterizations of Pareto optimality, define MWW graphs and
explore their relation with faces of the Pareto frontier, prove richness of the family and then proceed
with computational issues. For fixed n, the algorithm is built via reduction to a simple two-agent
case. For fixed m, we use an agent-item duality inspired by the Second Welfare Theorem. This
duality also shows a relation between MWW graphs and minimal pain per buck (MPB) graphs.
4.1 Criteria of Pareto optimality: no profitable trading cycles, maximization of
weighted utilitarian welfare, and MWW graphs
In this auxiliary subsection, we reformulate Pareto optimality using various languages which turn
out to be useful afterwards.
Profitable trading cycles. Consider a path P = (i1, j1, i2, j2, . . . , iL, jL, iL+1), where L ≥ 1, in
a complete ([n], [m])-bipartite digraph. We define the product of disutilities along the path as
pi(P) =
L∏
k=1
|vik,jk |
|vik+1,jk |
. (1)
A path P is a cycle if iL+1 = i1; a cycle is simple if no agent ik and no chore jk enter the cycle
twice.
Consider an allocation z and a cycle C = (i1, j1, . . . , iL+1 = i1), where L ≥ 2, such that each
agent ik consumes some fraction of chore jk (i.e., zik,jk > 0) for k = 1, . . . , L. We say that C is a
profitable trading cycle for z if pi(C) > 1.
Weighted utilitarian welfare and MWW graphs Consider a vector of weights τ ∈ Rn>0 and
define the weighted utilitarian welfare of an allocation z as
Wτ (z) =
∑
i∈[n]
τi · ui(zi).
Definition 14 (Maximal Weighted Welfare Graph). Let τ ∈ Rn>0 be a vector of weights. Consider
the ([n], [m])-bipartite graph such that agent i ∈ [n] and chore j ∈ [m] are linked if
τi · |vi,j | ≤ τi′ · |vi′,j | for each agent i′ ∈ [n].
We call this the Maximal Weighted Welfare (MWW) graph and denote it by Gτ = Gτ (v).
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The set of all MWW-graphs is denoted by
MWW(v) =
⋃
τ∈Rn>0
Gτ (v).
Proposition 15. Let v ∈ Rn×m<0 be a matrix of values and z a feasible allocation. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
1. the allocation z is Pareto optimal
2. there are no simple profitable trading cycles13
3. there exists a vector of weights τ ∈ Rn>0 such that the consumption graph Gz is a subgraph of
a maximal weighted welfare graph Gτ (v)
4. there exists a vector of weights τ ∈ Rn>0 such that z maximizes the weighted utilitarian welfare
Wτ over all feasible allocations
14.
For a more general cake-cutting setting, analogs of items 2,3,4 constitute Sections 8, 10, and 7 of
[Bar05]; the link between Pareto optimality and weighted utilitarian welfare is classic, see [Var74].
In contrast to the analogous results from [Bar05], Proposition 15 has a short proof.
Proof. We will show the implications (1)⇒ (2)⇒ (3)⇒ (4)⇒ (1).
• (1)⇒ (2) : Let us show that if there is a simple profitable trading cycle C = (i1, j1, . . . , iL+1 =
i1), then we can find a Pareto-improvement z
′ of the allocation z. Indeed, transfer εk amount
of jk from ik to ik+1 where the ratio of εk and εk+1 comes from the condition that all
agents ik+1, k = 1, . . . , L− 1 are indifferent between z and z′: vik+1,jk · εk = vik+1,jk+1 · εk+1.
These conditions define epsilons up to a multiplicative constant which can be selected small
enough to guarantee feasibility. Profitability of C implies that agent i1 is strictly better off:
εL · vi1,jL − ε1 · vi1,j1 = εL · vi1,jL(1− pi(C)) < 0 and thus z′ dominates z.
• (2) ⇒ (3) : Let i1 be an agent with a non-empty bundle zi1 6= 0. Set its weight to τi1 = 1.
For other agents i define τi as max pi(Pi1,i) where the maximum is taken over all paths
Pi1,i = (i1, j1, . . . , jL, iL+1 = i) connecting i1 and i such that zik,jk > 0 for all k = 1, . . . , L.
The set of such paths is non-empty: for example, it contains a path (i1, j1, i) for any chore j1
with zi1,j1 > 0. By statement (2), eliminating cycles in Pi1,i can only increase pi and thus the
maximum is finite and is attained on an acyclic path.
Consider the consumption graph Gz and let i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] be an agent and a chore that
are connected by an edge in Gz. We show that they are also connected in Gτ . For this we
13Similar characterizations of Pareto optimality are known for the house-allocation problem of [SS74], where n
indivisible goods (houses) are allocated among n agents with ordinal preferences, one to one. See [AS03] for ex-post
efficiency and [BM01] for SD-efficiency (aka ordinal efficiency).
14The link between Pareto optimal allocations and welfare maximization has a simple geometric origin and holds
for any problem with convex set U of feasible utility profiles. For any point U at the boundary, we can trace a
hyperplane h supporting U . Hence, any U on the boundary maximizes the linear form 〈τ, V 〉 over V ∈ U , where τ is
a normal vector to h. Thus, the Pareto frontier of U corresponds to τ with positive components.
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must check that τi · |vi,j | ≤ τi′ · |vi′,j | for each agent i′. Consider an optimal path P∗i1,i and
extend it to a path Pi1,i′ by adding two extra vertices j and i′. By definition of τ we get
τi′ ≥ pi(Pi1,i′) = pi(P∗i1,i) ·
|vi,j |
|vi′,j | = τi ·
|vi,j |
|vi′,j |
which is equivalent to the desired inequality.
• (3) ⇒ (4) : Statement (3) ensures that each chore j is given to an agent i with the lowest
weighted disutility τi · |vi,j |. Therefore, z has the maximal weighted welfare Wτ among all
feasible allocations.
• (4) ⇒ (1) : If z′ Pareto dominates z, then Wτ (z′) > Wτ (z). Thus, the maximizer of Wτ is
undominated, which gives Pareto optimality.
If the consumption graph Gz contains a cycle C with pi(C) < 1, then by inverting the order of
vertices we get a profitable trading cycle. Therefore, statement (2) of the proposition implies the
following corollary.
Corollary 16. If an allocation z is Pareto optimal and its corresponding consumption graph Gz
contains a cycle C, then pi(C) = 1.
In other words, Gz can have cycles only for matrices of values v satisfying certain algebraic
equations. This observation is known (see the proof of Lemma 1 in [BMSY18]) and motivates
us to consider non-degenerate problems, where no such equations hold. It turns out that such
non-degenerate problems have better algorithmic properties (see Subsection 6.3 and [SSH19]).
4.2 Richness of the MWW family. Encoding faces of the Pareto frontier by
MWW-graphs.
Recall that a collection of ([n], [m])-bipartite graphs is rich for a division problem (v,b) if for any
competitive utility profile u ∈ CU(v,b) there is a competitive allocation z, such that u(z) = u and
the consumption graph Gz belongs to the collection.
By the first welfare theorem (Theorem 9), any competitive allocation is Pareto optimal. There-
fore, Proposition 15 almost implies richness of the set of all MWW-graphs: indeed, by statement (3)
of the proposition, for any Pareto optimal allocation z, there is a graph G′ ∈ MWW(v) containing
Gz as a subgraph. However, Gz itself can be outside of MWW(v).
Showing richness requires finding a relation between MWW graphs and faces of the Pareto
frontier.
Bijection between faces of the Pareto frontier and MWW graphs. Consider the polytope
U ⊂ Rn of feasible utility profiles. If h is a hyperplane touching the boundary of U , then U ∩ h is
a face of U , see Figure 2. This face may have arbitrary dimension from 0 (a vertex) to n − 1 (a
proper face of maximal dimension); see [Zie12] for the introduction to geometry of polytopes. The
Pareto frontier U∗ is a union of faces.
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Assume that the hyperplane h is given by the equation {u ∈ Rn : 〈τ,u〉 = C} and fix the sign
of τ in such a way that U is contained in the half-space 〈τ,x〉 ≤ C. Then f has the following dual
representation: it maximizes the linear form 〈τ,u〉 over u ∈ U . The converse is also true: the set
of maximizers for any non-zero τ is a face.
Figure 2: One-dimensional face f as the set u ∈ U maximizing 〈τ,u〉 (left); a zero-dimensional face,
i.e., an extreme point (right). For faces f of maximal dimension, the vector τ is uniquely defined
up to a multiplicative constant while there is a continuum of τ for lower-dimensional faces (for a
given face f , the set of τ forms the interior of the normal cone to f depicted by the green region).
Denote by Zf the set of all allocations z corresponding to a face f , that is,
Zf = {z ∈ A | u(z) ∈ f}.
Lemma 17. There is a bijection f ↔ Gf between faces of the Pareto frontier and MWW(v). A
feasible allocation z belongs to Zf if and only if Gz is a subgraph of Gf .
Proof. Statement (3) of Proposition 15 implies the result since there is a one-to-one correspondence
between faces of U∗ and solutions to 〈τ,u〉 → max, when τ ranges over Rn>0.
Richness. For any utility profile u, consider the set Zu of all feasible allocations z with u(z) = u.
Lemma 18. For any Pareto-optimal utility profile u ∈ U∗, there is a feasible allocation z ∈ Zu
such that Gz ∈ MWW(v).
Proof of Lemma 18. If u is a vertex (i.e., a zero-dimensional face f), then consider Gf ∈ MWW(v)
from Lemma 17 and pick any allocation z with Gz = Gf . Then the lemma implies that u(z) = u
and we are done.
If u is not a vertex, then we can find a face f ⊂ U∗ such that u is in its relative interior fint
(i.e., u ∈ f but not a boundary point of f). Indeed, consider some face f ′ containing u; if u is not
in its relative interior, then we can find a face f ′′ of the boundary of f ′ such that u ∈ f ′′; since the
new face has a smaller dimension, after a finite number of repetitions, we either find a desired face
f or find out that u is a vertex.
Fix an auxiliary allocation zmax with Gzmax = Gf . Then u(zmax) ∈ f by Lemma 17. Since
u ∈ fint, we can represent the utility profile u as
u = ε · u(zmax) + (1− ε) · u′,
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where the vector u′ is given by
u′ =
u− ε · u(zmax)
1− ε
which belongs to f for ε > 0 small enough. Consider an allocation z = ε · zmax + (1− ε)z′, where
z′ ∈ Zu′ . By the construction, u(z) = u and Gz = Gf ∈ MWW(v).
We get the following desired corollary.
Corollary 19. The set of graphs MWW(v) is rich.
Proof. By the second welfare theorem (Theorem 9) any competitive utility profile u is Pareto
optimal. Thus, Lemma 18 allows one to find a feasible allocation z with u(z) = u and Gz ∈
MWW(v), which is competitive by the Pareto-indifference property (Corollary 10).
Remark 20. By the construction, the allocation z from Lemma 18 has the maximal graph Gz
w.r.t. subgraph-inclusion among allocations from Zu. This gives an alternative interpretation of
MWW(v) as the set of all consumption graphs of Pareto-optimal allocations that are maximal
w.r.t. inclusion.
4.3 Polynomial-time algorithm listing a superset of all MWW-graphs. Fixed
number of agents via reduction to the 2-agent case.
We explicitly construct MWW(v) for two agents and then use the construction to build a polynomial
time algorithm which outputs a superset G(v) of MWW (v) for arbitrary fixed n.
Two agents. For n = 2 agents, the set of all MWW graphs has the following simple structure
described in [BMSY18] and also used in [ACI18]. Reorder all the chores, from those that are
relatively harmless to agent 1 to those that are harmless to agent 2: the ratios |v1,j |/|v2,j | must be
weakly increasing in j = 1, . . . ,m. As we see next, there are two types of graphs in MWW(v):
• k/(k + 1)-split, for k = 0, 1, . . . ,m: agent 1 is linked to all chores 1, . . . , k (if any) and agent
2 is linked to all remaining k + 1, . . . ,m. No other edges exist.
• k-cuts, for k = 1, . . . ,m: agent 1 is linked to chores 1, . . . , k−1, agent 2 to chores k+1, . . . ,m,
and all chores j for which |v1,j |/|v2,j | = |v1,k|/|v2,k| are connected to both agents. No other
edges exist.
Figure 3: Examples of MWW graphs for the two-agent problem with
v1,3
v2,3
=
v1,4
v2,4
. Because of equal
ratios, agents share bads 3 and 4 at the 4-cut.
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Lemma 21. For two agents, any graph G ∈ MWW (v) is either a k/(k + 1)-split or a k-cut.15
Any k-cut is contained in MWW(v). A k/(k+ 1)-split is contained in MWW(v) if and only if one
of the following holds: k = 0, or k = m, or |v1,k|/|v2,k| < |v1,k+1|/|v2,k+1|.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary graph Gτ from MWW (v). Agent 1 is linked to chores j such that
τ1 ·|v1,j | ≤ τ2 ·|v2,j | or equivalently to those chores from the “prefix” chores with |v1,j |/|v2,j | ≤ τ2/τ1.
Similarly, an edge is traced between agent 2 and the “postfix” |v1,j |/|v2,j | ≥ τ2/τ1. Thus, if the
ratio τ2/τ1 is equal to one of the values |v1,k|/|v2,k|, for k = 1, . . . ,m, we get a split allocation and
otherwise a cut.
This lemma implies that for two agents, the set of all MWW graphs can be listed in polynomial
time in m.
Corollary 22. For two agents, the set of all MWW graphs contains at most 2m+ 1 graphs. All of
them can be listed using O(m · logm) operations (time needed to sort the ratios) or O(m) if chores
are already sorted.
More than two agents. For a division problem with n ≥ 3 agents given by matrix v, consider
n(n − 1)/2 auxiliary two-agent problems, where a pair of agents i 6= i′ divides the whole set of
chores [m] between themselves (the corresponding 2×m matrix v{i,i′} is composed by the two rows
vi and vi′ of v).
Pick an MWW graph G{i,i′} ∈ MWW(v{i,i′}) for each pair of agents and construct a graph G
for the original problem by the following rule: there is an edge between agent i and a chore j if
and only if this edge is presented in G{i,i′} for all agents i′ 6= i.
By cycling over all combinations of graphs G{i,i′} we obtain a set G = G(v) of graphs G.
Proposition 23. The set G(v) constructed for an n × m matrix of values v has the following
properties:
• it contains at most (2m+ 1)n(n−1)2 graphs
• for fixed n ≥ 3, enumerating the elements of G(v) takes time O(mn(n−1)2 +1)
• it contains the set MWW(v) (and thus by Corollary 19, G(v) is rich)
Proof. By Corollary 22, for each pair {i, i′} there are at most 2m+ 1 different graphs G{i,i′}, thus
at most (2m + 1)
n(n−1)
2 combinations, and we get the first item. The same corollary implies that
cycling over all combinations of G{i,i′} takes O
(
m
n(n−1)
2
)
which for n ≥ 3 absorbs O(m logm), the
time needed to sort the chores for each pair of agents. When a combination is given, G can be
constructed using O(m) operations, yielding the second item.
It remains to check that any graph Gτ (v) ∈ MWW(v) is contained in G. Let us find graphs
G{i,i′} in the construction of G such that G = Gτ (v). Pick G{i,i
′} equal to G(τi,τi′ ) ∈ MWW(v{i,i
′}).
Hence, i is connected to j in G{i,i′} iff τi · vi,j ≥ τi′ · vi′,j . Therefore, an edge (i, j) is traced in G if
and only if τi · vi,j ≥ τi′ · vi′,j for all i′, which by the definition of MWW graphs, is equivalent to
G = Gτ (v).
15Geometrically k/(k + 1)-splits correspond to vertices of the Pareto frontier and k-cuts to faces.
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Remark 24. Note that the set G may contain some clearly redundant elements: those where some
chores are not connected to any agents (thus no feasible allocation corresponds to them), or where
some agents consume no chores (hence no competitive allocation has such a consumption graph),
or just consumption graphs of Pareto sub-optimal allocations. Eliminating them may improve
the performance of the algorithm in practice. Inefficient graphs can be found using item 2 from
Proposition 15: inefficiency is equivalent to existence of a cycle with a multiplicative weight above
1 in an auxiliary bipartite graph; such cycles can be detected using, for example, a multiplicative
version of the Bellman-Ford algorithm.
Proposition 23 and Lemma 17 imply an upper bound on the number of faces of the Pareto
frontier. In Section 5 we show that there is at most one competitive utility profile per face and
therefore get the following corollary.
Corollary 25. The number of faces of the Pareto frontier and the number of competitive utility
profiles (for a given vector of budgets b) are both bounded by (2m+ 1)
n(n−1)
2 .
4.4 Algorithm for a fixed number of chores. Agent-item duality and the relation
between MWW and MPB graphs
A polynomial algorithm for a fixed number of chores m and large n follows from the algorithm for
fixed n via the duality that allows one to exchange the roles of agents and chores. We interpret
this duality as a repercussion of the Second Welfare theorem and show that MWW graph of the
dual problem is a minimal pain per buck (MPB) graph.
Agent-item duality via the Second Welfare Theorem. For a matrix of values v with n
agents and m chores, consider the transposed matrix vT where agents and chores exchanged their
roles, so we have m agents and n chores.
There is the natural bijection between bipartite graphs on ([n], [m]) and ([m], [n]) and we will
not distinguish between them. We say that a bipartite graph G on ([n], [m]) has no lonely agents
if every agent i is connected to at least one chore. By MWWnon−lonely(v) we denote the set of all
MWW graphs with no lonely agents.
Proposition 26. For a matrix v of values with non-zero elements we have
MWWnon−lonely(v) = MWWnon−lonely(vT ).
Definition 27 (Minimal Pain Per Buck (MPB)). For a matrix v of values and a price vector
p ∈ Rm<0, the minimal pain per buck graph Gp(v) is constructed by tracing edges between each
agent i and all chores j with minimum disutility/price ratio |vi,j |/|pj |.
In the case of goods, maximal bang per buck (MBB) graphs were introduced in [DPSV02] to
capture the demand structure for competitive allocations as a function of prices. Indeed, if z is a
competitive allocation for prices p and budgets b, then Gz is a subgraph of Gp(v) (see Lemma 44
in the appendix).
An immediate corollary of the definitions is the relation between MWW and MPB graphs16.
16Corollary 28 allows one to interpret Proposition 26 as a version of the Second Welfare Theorem: informally, it
says that the class of MWW graphs (which encode the consumption structure of Pareto optimal allocation) coincides
with the class of MPB graphs (which encode the consumption structure of competitive allocations).
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Corollary 28. An MPB graph Gp(v) coincides with the MWW graph Gτ (v
T ), where τj =
1
|pj | .
Proof of Proposition 26. By the symmetry of the statement, it is enough to show the inclusion
MWWnon−lonely(v) ⊂ MWWnon−lonely(vT ). Pick a vector τ ∈ Rn>0 such that the graph G = Gτ (v)
has no lonely agents. By Corollary 28, it is enough to find a price vector p ∈ Rm<0 such that
G = Gp(v).
Consider an allocation z such that Gz = G. By Proposition 15, z is Pareto optimal and
u = u(z) ∈ Rn<0 (here we use the fact that there are no lonely agents). By the Second Welfare
Theorem, z is a competitive allocation for some p ∈ Rm<0 and budgets bi = τi · ui (see the proof of
Theorem 9).
Therefore, Gz is a subgraph of Gp(v). Let us show that these two graphs coincide. Assume the
converse: there is an edge (i, j) in Gp(v) that is absent in Gτ (v). By the definition of MPB graphs
we have |vi,j |
|pj | = minc∈[m]
|vi,c|
|pc| ,
and the same equality holds for any agent i′ with zi′,j > 0. Thus, |vi,j | · bi/pb = ui (because agent i
spends his budget bi on items with minimal disutility to price ratio) and similarly |vi′,j |·bi′/pj = ui′ .
We obtain the identity
vi,j · bi
ui
=
vi′,j · bi′
ui′
.
Taking into account the relation between b and τ , we get τi · vi,j = τi′ · vi′,j = mini′′ τi′′ · vi′′,j
(the last equality follows from the definition of Gτ (v) and the fact that zi,j > 0). Thus, the edge
(i, j) must exist in Gτ (v). This is a contradiction, which completes the proof.
4.4.1 Algorithmic consequences: fixed number of chores m
If the number of agents n in a problem (v,b) is large compared to m, we can use the following
trick.
Compute a superset G(vT ) of MWWnon−lonely(vT ), using the algorithm from Subsection 4.3.
For fixed m, it will take polynomial time in n. By Proposition 26, MWWnon−lonely(vT ) coincides
with MWWnon−lonely(v) which is rich since the set of all MWW graphs is and any competitive
allocation with non-zero budgets has no lonely agents. Thus, G(vT ) is also rich.
The number of competitive utility profiles cannot exceed the number of graphs in a rich set.
We obtain a mirror version of Corollary 25.
Corollary 29. The number of competitive utility profiles (for a given vector of budgets b) is at
most (2n+ 1)
m(m−1)
2 .
5 Explicit formulas for competitive utility profiles when the con-
sumption graph is known
Suppose we are given an ([n], [m])-bipartite graph G, a matrix of values v ∈ Rn×m<0 , and a vector
of budgets b ∈ Rn<0. Here we derive an explicit formula that expresses the vector u = u(z) of
utilities for a competitive allocation z with budgets b and the consumption graph Gz = G, if such
an allocation exists. If there is no such z, the formula returns some vector u ∈ Rn<0 that may not
correspond to any allocation.
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The question of recovering z from u is considered in Section 6.
5.1 Influence of agents from the same connected component.
If two agents i and i′ share a chore j at a competitive allocation z, then their utilities are related
(see item (2) of Proposition 46 from the appendix):
vi,j · bi
ui
=
vi′,j · bi′
ui′
. (2)
This observation can be extended to agents from the same connected component of the con-
sumption graph Gz. Consider two of them, i and i
′, linked in Gz by a path
Pi,i′ = (i = i1, j1, i2, j2, . . . , jL, iL+1 = i′).
We define the influence pii,i′ of agent i
′ on agent i as the product pi(Pi,i′) of disutilities along the
path; see (1) for the formal definition of pi. We use convention pii,i = 1.
The influence is well-defined: if there are different paths from i to i′ all of them have the same
product of disutilities because for any Pareto optimal allocation, the product along a cycle in Gz
equals 1 (Corollary 16).
By iteratively applying equation (2), we get the following result.
Corollary 30. For a competitive allocation z with budgets b, and any agents i and i′ from the
same connected component of the consumption graph Gz, the following identity holds
ui
bi
= pii,i′ · ui
′
bi′
. (3)
Remark 31. The influences pii,i′ can be computed in strongly polynomial time using the depth-first
search even if none of n and m are fixed.
Note that if we compute pii,i′ starting from a graph G that does not correspond to any com-
petitive allocation, pii,i′ may depend on a path between i and i
′. In this case, we assume that the
algorithm can choose any of the paths. In any case, such graphs will be eliminated in the third
phase of the algorithm (see next Section 6).
5.2 Recovering the competitive utility profile
Given a graph G, denote by nj the number of agents linked to a chore j; this can be seen as the
“degree” of j.
Consider an auxiliary allocation z obtained by giving 1/nj share of j to each agent linked to j.
If nj = 0 (in this case G is not a consumption graph of any allocation z), then the chore j remains
unallocated. Denote by u the utility profile of z and by N i the set of all agents from the connected
component of i in G. The following proposition gives an explicit formula for a competitive utility
profile in terms of G.
Proposition 32. Fix a division problem (v,b) and a graph G. If there exists a competitive allo-
cation z with the consumption graph Gz = G, the following formula holds for u = u(z)
ui =
(
bi∑
i′∈N i bi′
)
·
∑
i′∈N i
pii,i′ · ui′ . (4)
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Proof. Equations (3) determine competitive utilities for i′ ∈ N i up to a common multiplicative
factor. To find it, we need one more condition that relates components (ui′)i′∈N i .
Denote by Ci the set of chores consumed by agents from N i. These agents spend all their
budgets on Ci and consume them fully. Therefore, we get the balance equation∑
i′∈N i
bi′ =
∑
j∈Ci
pj . (5)
Using the definition of z and expressing pj by Lemma 45, we rewrite the last sum as∑
i′∈N i
∑
j∈Ci
pj · zi′,j =
∑
i′∈N i
∑
j∈Ci
vi′,j · bi′
ui′
· zi′,j .
Taking the factor bi′/ui′ out of the internal sum, representing ui′ by (3), and comparing the first
equation and the last one, we get that∑
i′∈N i
bi′ =
∑
i′∈N i
pii,i′ · bi
ui
· ui′ .
Writing ui using this equation, we obtain the required identity (4).
Corollary 33. For a given problem (v,b) and a graph G, the candidate utility profile u can be
computed using O(nm(n+m)) operations even if both n and m are free parameters.
Indeed, in order to construct the matrix pii,i′ of “distances”, it is enough to find pii0,i for a fixed i0 in
each connected component of G (takes O(nm(n+m)) if Bellman-Ford algorithm for multiplicative
weights is used) and then define pii,i′ as
pii0,i′
pii0,i
. The connected component N i0 of agent i0 can be
discovered “for free” by the Belman-Ford algorithm while computing pii0,i. When all the ingredients
are precomputed, finding ui by formula (4) takes O(n) per agent.
Note that if we use formula (4) starting from a graph G that is not a consumption graph of a
competitive allocation, then we may get an infeasible vector u ∈ Rn<0.
6 Checking that a given utility profile is competitive using varia-
tional characterization. Recovering an allocation and prices.
In this section we consider the following problem. We are given a “candidate” utility profile u ∈ Rn<0,
a vector of budgets b ∈ Rn<0 and a matrix of values v without zeros. We do not know whether u
is feasible or not.
The goal is to check whether u can be represented as the utility profile u(z) at a competitive
allocation z with budget vector b and, if the answer is positive, to find at least one such allocation
and the corresponding vector of prices.
First we describe a characterization of competitive allocations as maximizers of weighted utili-
tarian welfare. This allows us to reduce the question about the existence of z to an analysis of an
auxiliary maximum flow problem: u is a competitive utility profile if there is a flow of large enough
magnitude, and this maximum flow immediately gives z as in [DPSV02].
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6.1 Variational characterization of competitive allocations
For vectors u,b ∈ Rn<0, define the vector
τ(u,b) =
(
bi
ui
)
i∈[n]
(6)
and consider the weighted utilitarian welfare at an allocation y with weights τ(u,b); recall that
this is given by Wτ (y) =
∑
i∈[n] τi(u,b) · ui(yi).
Proposition 34. A feasible allocation z with u = u(z) ∈ Rn<0 is competitive for a chore division
problem (v,b) if and only if y = z maximizes Wτ(u,b)(y) over all feasible allocations y.
Proposition 34 is known (see proof of Theorem 1 in [BMSY17]); for convenience we also prove
it in the appendix (Proposition 46).
This variational characterization has a flavor of fixed points: it defines a competitive allocation
z as a solution to an optimization problem depending on u(z). Hence it does not help to find z,
but allows one to check whether a given allocation is competitive or not.
6.2 Maximum flow problem to check competitiveness of the utility profile u
and recover the allocation z
An allocation z maximizes the weighted utilitarian welfare Wτ(u,b) if and only if Gz is a subgraph
of Gτ(u,b) (see Proposition 15). Hence, Proposition 34 has the following corollary.
Corollary 35. A vector u ∈ Rn<0 is a competitive utility profile for budgets b ∈ Rn<0 and a matrix
of values v if and only if there exists a feasible allocation z such that the following two conditions
are satisfied:
1. u = u(z)
2. the consumption graph Gz is a subgraph of Gτ(u,b).
Moreover, the set of all such z (if non-empty) coincides with the set of all competitive allocations
with the utility profile u.
The existence of z satisfying the conditions of Corollary 35 can be checked by the following
maximum flow problem. A similar construction has been described in [DPSV02] for checking that
the price-vector consists of equilibrium prices.
For each chore j ∈ [m], denote the minimal weighted disutility by
qj = min
i∈[n]
∣∣∣∣bi · vi,jui
∣∣∣∣ .
Note that for competitive allocations, qj equals the absolute value of the price pj (Lemma 45).
Construct a network N(v,u,b) by adding a source node s and a terminal node t to a complete
bipartite graph with parts ([n], [m]): the source s is connected to all the agents [n] and the terminal
node t is connected to all the chores [m]. The capacity of each edge w(s, i), i ∈ [n] is |bi|; for all edges
(i, j) we set w(i, j) = +∞, if this edge exists in Gτ(u,b), and w(i, j) = 0, otherwise (equivalently,
edges not presented in Gτ(u,b) are not traced); we set w(j, t) = qj for all edges (j, t), j ∈ [m]. Note
that no flow F in this network can exceed the amount
∑
i∈[n] |bi|, which is the total capacity of all
edges (s, i).
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Figure 4: An example of a network N(v,u,b). Only edges from Gτ(u,b) are traced between agents
and chores and these edges have a capacity of ∞; the capacity of an edge connecting the source s
and an agent i is |bi|, and the capacity of an edge from chore j to the terminal node is qj . If there
is a competitive allocation z ∈ CA(v,b) with Gz being a subgraph of Gτ(u,b), then qj is equal to
equilibrium price pj and the flow between agent i and chore j is |pj |zi,j , the absolute amount i
spends on j.
Proposition 36. A utility profile u is competitive if and only if the two following conditions are
satisfied:
• ∑i∈[n] |bi| = ∑j∈[m] qj
• a maximal flow F in N(v,u,b) has magnitude ∑i∈[n] |bi|.
Any such flow defines a competitive allocation z = z(F) with u = u(z) by zi,j = Fi,j/qj and vice
versa.
Proof. Consider a maximum flow F of magnitude
∑
i∈[n] |bi| =
∑
j∈[m] qj and check that z(F)
satisfies the conditions of Corollary 35. For all edges e = (s, i), i ∈ [n] and e = (j, t), j ∈ [m],
we have Fe = w(e) because the magnitude of F equals the capacity of the corresponding cuts.
Therefore, ∑
i∈[n]
zi,j =
1
qj
∑
i∈[n]
Fi,j =
1
qj
Fj,t = 1
for each chore j and hence z is a feasible allocation. Now check that u(z) = u:
ui(z) =
∑
j∈[m]
vi,j · zi,j =
∑
j∈[m]
vi,j
qj
· Fi,j =
∑
j∈[m]
ui
|bi| · Fi,j =
ui
|bi|
∑
j∈[m]
Fi,j =
ui
|bi| · Fs,i = ui.
Therefore, the first condition of the corollary holds. The second one (Gz is a subgraph of Gτ ) is
fulfilled automatically and thus z is a competitive allocation and u = u(z) is a competitive utility
profile.
We now check that if z is a competitive allocation and u = u(z), then
∑
i∈[n] |bi| =
∑
j∈[m] qj
and there is a maximum flow F with magnitude
∑
i∈[n] |bi| given by Fi,j = zi,jqj . Indeed, as z is
competitive, we have qj = −pj , where p is the competitive price vector (Lemma 45). Then the
condition
∑
i∈[n] |bi| =
∑
j∈[m] qj is satisfied because the amount of money spent equals the sum of
prices. Consider a flow F that represents how much money (in absolute value) each agent i spends
on a particular chore j. Define Fs,i as the total spending of i which equals |bi| (and thus the flow
saturates each edge (s, i) and has the proper magnitude); Fi,j = zi,j |pj | is the absolute value of
the amount i spends on j. Thus we have a balance equation Fs,i = |bi| =
∑
j∈[m] Fi,j and capacity
constraints are satisfied since Gz is a subgraph of Gτ(u,b). For each chore j the inflow
∑
i Fi,j is
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the total number of money spent on j, which equals the absolute value of the price |pj |. Therefore
defining Fj,t = |pj | we get a feasible flow of magnitude
∑
i∈[n] |bi| in N(v,u,b).
Algorithmic consequences. There are many efficient algorithms for solving maximum flow
problems. For example, the Edmonds-Karp algorithm has linear runtime in the number of vertices
in the network and quadratic in the number of edges [KT06]. Proposition 36 and Lemma 45 thus
yield the following algorithmic corollary.
Corollary 37. Given a chore division problem (v,b) and a vector u ∈ Rn<0
• it can be checked whether u is a competitive utility profile, and
• if the answer is positive, a competitive allocation z with u(z) = u and the corresponding vector
of prices p can be computed
in time O((m+ n)m2n2).
6.3 Computing all competitive allocations
For any feasible vector of utilities u ∈ U the set Zu of feasible allocations z with u(z) = u is a
convex polytope. Therefore, for given v and b, the set of all competitive allocations CA(v,b) is a
disjoint union of convex polytopes.
By computing a polytope P we will assume enumerating a finite number of points p1, . . . , pk
such that P is their convex hull.
It turns out that the set of all competitive allocations can be computed efficiently for “non-
degenerate” division problems but this task becomes computationally non-tractable for the set of
degenerate v having Lebesgue measure zero.
General problems: enumerating all competitive allocations can be difficult. Finding
the set of all competitive allocations is hard for a general division problem: for a fixed number of
agents n computing even one connected component of CA(v,b) may take an exponential number
of operations in m. Let us illustrate it by the following example.
Example 2. Two agents divide the set [m] of identical chores: vi,j = −1 for all i, j. Budgets are
equal. The set of feasible utilities U is the linear segment between (−m, 0) and (0,−m). The only
critical point of the Nash product |u1| · |u2| on this interval is the point u =
(−m2 ,−m2 ). The set
of all competitive allocations is thus the convex hull of all z with zi,j ∈ {0, 1} such that each row
of the matrix z has m/2 non-zero elements and each column has only one. The number of such
matrices is given by a binomial coefficient C
m/2
m which grows exponentially for large m.
Therefore, the set of all competitive allocations has an exponential number of extreme points
and enumerating them all takes at least an exponential number of operations.
Non-degenerate division problems: finding all competitive allocations is easy. It turns
out that the situation where there are many allocations corresponding to the same Pareto optimal
utility profile u is extremely rare. As it was observed in [BMSY18] (see Lemma 2 there), it can
occur only if matrix v satisfies certain algebraic conditions.
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Proposition 38. Consider a matrix v with strictly negative entries. If for any cycle C in a complete
bipartite graph the product pi(C) 6= 1 (the product pi is defined by formula (1)), then for any Pareto
optimal utility profile u the set of corresponding allocations Zu is a singleton {z} and the allocation
z has acyclic consumption graph Gz.
If v,u, and Gz are given, the allocation z can be recovered in strongly polynomial time (both n
and m are free parameters).
By Theorem 11, the set of competitive utility profiles can be computed in strongly polynomial
time for fixed n or m. Combining this result with Proposition 38, we see that for v satisfying the
conditions of the proposition, the set of all competitive allocations can also be computed in strongly
polynomial time.
Remark 39. If n or m are fixed, then we can check whether a given matrix v satisfies conditions
of Proposition 38 in strongly polynomial time by inspecting each simple cycle (in a bipartite graph
with parts [n] and [m] there are at most (nm)min{n,m} of them17).
A multiplicative version of the Bellman-Ford algorithm for finding negative cycles gives a
strongly polynomial algorithm if none of the parameters is fixed.
Proof of Proposition 38. Any z ∈ Zu has acyclic Gz because by Proposition 15 (statement (2)) any
cycle we must have pi(C) = 1 which violates the assumption on v.
If z and z′ are contained in Zu, then Gz = Gz′ since otherwise G z+z′
2
has a cycle (see Lemma 2
in [BMSY18] for a detailed argument).
Therefore, all allocations z ∈ Zu have the same consumption graph G. The proof is completed
by the algorithm that takes (v,u = u(z)) and an acyclic consumption graph G = Gz and outputs
the unique allocation z18:
• Since G is acyclic, there is a leaf: a vertex with degree 1. Pick such a leaf.
– If the leaf is a chore, then it must be allocated to an agent consuming it and then
eliminated from G.
– If the leaf is an agent i, denote by yi the bundle of chores already allocated to i. There
is exactly one chore j linked to i but not yet allocated to him.
A share zi,j of j must satisfy the condition ui = ui(yi) + vi,jzi,j . Define zi as the union
of yi and zi,j the amount of j.
An agent i is eliminated from G; the chore j is eliminated if is already fully allocated.
• The procedure is repeated until there are no vertices left in G.
Since all the decisions are dictated by G and the condition u(z) = u, the allocation z constructed
by the algorithm is the unique element of Zu.
17There are at most n choices for the “first” vertex of a cycle, m options for the second, n − 1 options for the
third plus one option to complete the cycle, etc. Therefore, there are not more than (nm)q cycles visiting each part
of the graph at most q times. For a simple cycle, q cannot exceed the size of the smaller component. This leads to
the upper bound (nm)min{n,m} for the total number of simple cycles in a bipartite graph.
18The authors are grateful to Ekaterina Rzhevskaya for suggesting this algorithm.
27
7 Finding approximately-fair allocations of indivisible chores
If items are indivisible, envy-free allocations may fail to exist (e.g., one item and two agents). This
motivates considering relaxed fairness notions.
Recently [BK19] described how to round a divisible competitive allocation with goods in order
to get an approximately fair Pareto optimal indivisible allocation. Their approach extends word
by word to the case of chores. We will describe the main ingredients and refer to the original paper
for the details of construction.
7.1 Relaxed fairness notions
An allocation z is indivisible if zi,j equals either 0 or 1. We will identify an indivisible bundle zi
with the set of those chores that are consumed by i; this will allow us using a set-theoretic notation.
Definition 40 (weighted-EF11). For a weight vector β ∈ Rn>0, an indivisible allocation z of chores
is envy-free up to removal of a chore from the first bundle and addition of another chore to the
other bundle if for any pair of agents i with non-empty bundle zi and i
′ there are two chores j ∈ zi
and j′ ∈ [m] such that
ui(zi \ {j})
βi
≥ ui(zi′ ∪ {j
′})
βi′
. (7)
In the original definition for goods from [BK19], an agent i adds one item to his own bundle
and throws away an item from the bundle of i′.
Another popular fairness property, Proportionality, claims that every agent must prefer his
bundle to equal division. Its relaxed version was introduced for the case of goods in [CFS17]. For
chores we have a mirror-definition.
Definition 41 (weighted-Prop1). An indivisible allocation of chores z is weighted-proportional up
to one chore with a weight vector β ∈ Rn>0 if for each agent i with non-empty bundle zi there is a
chore j ∈ zi such that
ui(zi \ {j}) ≥ βi∑n
i′=1 βi′
ui([m]). (8)
7.2 The result
Theorem 42. For any chore division problem (v,b), there exists an indivisible allocation z that is
Pareto optimal in the divisible problem (u(z) ∈ U∗) and satisfies weighted-EF11 and weighted-Prop1.
If the number of agents n or the number of chores m is fixed, then such an allocation can be
found in strongly polynomial time.
Note that the algorithmic part of the proposition is non-trivial only for the case of fixed n (for
fixed m, the total number of indivisible allocations nm is polynomial in n and thus the exhaustive
search gives a strongly polynomial algorithm).
Theorem 42 is a combination of Theorem 11 (algorithm for computing a divisible competitive
allocation) and the following theorem, which is the straightforward modification of a similar result
of [BK19] for goods.
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Theorem 43 (Barman and Krishnamurthy [BK19]). For a given matrix of values v with vi,j < 0,
a vector of budgets b ∈ Rn<0, and a competitive allocation z with a vector of prices p, there exists
an integral feasible allocation z′ that is competitive for the same vector of prices p and a new vector
of budgets b′ ∈ Rn− that is close to b:
• for each agent i with non-empty z′i, there are chores j ∈ z′i and j′ ∈ [m] such that
bi − |pj | ≤ b′i ≤ bi + |pj′ |. (9)
• for agents i with empty z′i, there is a chore j′ ∈ [m] such that
bi < b
′
i = 0 < bi + |pj′ |. (10)
Allocation z′ can be computed in strongly polynomial time.
Proof. The proof repeats the one for goods (Theorem 3.1 in [BK19]) without any changes. We
briefly describe the two main steps:
1. The first step of the rounding procedure is to find a feasible allocation zacyc with u(z) =
u(zacyc) and acyclic consumption graph Gzacyc . This can be done for any Pareto optimal
allocation: each cycle in Gz can be broken by a cyclic exchange that leaves every agent
indifferent (see Lemma 1 in [BMSY18] and Proposition 15). Alternative construction for
competitive allocations can be found in [BK19]19.
Note that for almost all matrices v, this cycle-elimination step is redundant because a con-
sumption graph of any Pareto optimal allocation z can contain no cycles (see Theorem 42).
2. By Lemmas 44 and 45, the allocation zacyc is competitive with the same p and b.
The allocation zacyc is rounded using the following procedure:
Start with a graph G = Gzacyc . Fix an orientation of all edges by picking a “root” agent in
each connected component of G (thus making it a rooted tree) and orienting all edges from
the root to leaves.
i) If a chore j is linked to only one agent i in G, allocate j to i and eliminate j from G.
Repeat for all such chores.
ii) Pick a “root” agent i. Consider the set yi of chores already allocated to i.
– While there is a chore j′ connected to i such that pj′ +
∑
j∈yi pj ≥ bi, add j′ to yi
and eliminate j′ from G.
The final allocation z′i of agent i is set to be equal to yi; agent i is eliminated from G.
iii) If there are “root” chores (former “children” of i), allocate them arbitrarily to their
“child” agents and eliminate from G.
Steps ii)-iii) are repeated until there are no vertices left in G.
The resulting allocation z′ is competitive with the vector of prices p and some budget b′ with
b′i =
∑
j∈z′i pj because agent i consumes only those items he consumed at the allocation z and
thus MPB conditions are fulfilled (see Lemma 44).
19Since every Pareto optimal allocation is competitive, the two approaches are equivalent.
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By the construction, if bi < b
′
i then there is always a chore j
′ linked to i in Gzacyc but not
allocated to i at z′i and such that b
′
i−|pj′ | ≤ bi; this gives the right-hand side of inequalities (9)
and (10). Similarly, if bi > b
′
i, eliminating the last chore allocated to i from his bundle changes
the sign of the inequality thus giving the left-hand side of (9). Remaining cases are verified
similarly.
Let us check that Theorems 43 and 11 together imply Theorem 42.
Proof of Theorem 42. By Theorem 11 we can compute a competitive allocation z with the vector
of budgets b = −β and Theorem 43 shows that from z we can build integral competitive allocation
z′ with a budget satisfying (9) and (10). This allocation is Pareto optimal by the first welfare
theorem (Proposition 9).
For EF11, consider agents i with non-empty z
′
i and i
′. By (9) we pick j ∈ z′i and j′ ∈ [m] such
that
∑
c∈z′i\{j} pc ≥ −βi and similarly
∑
c∈z′
i′∪{j′}
pc ≤ −βj . Therefore, a bundle βiβj (z′i′ ∪{j′})∪{j}
has a lower price than z′i and thus the inequality (7) follows from the fact that i maximizes his
utility among all bundles with a lower price.
To prove Prop1, note that the bundle βi∑n
i′=1 βi′
[m] has the price −βi. By (9), we can find j ∈ z′i
such that the price of z′i \ {j} is higher than −βi. Therefore, βi∑n
i′=1 βi′
[m] ∪ {j} is cheaper than z′i
and (8) follows since agent i maximizes his utility on the budget constraint.
8 Concluding remarks
Our main contribution is the new approach for computing competitive allocations for economies,
where the set of competitive allocations may be disconnected.
Several directions remain open. First, it is not known whether one competitive allocation of
chores can be computed in polynomial time if neither n nor m are fixed. Second, we have seen that
for economies with chores, computing all competitive utility profiles is not harder than computing
the Pareto frontier. This could be an example of a general effect and we expect that the algorithm
extends to other division problems, where the Pareto frontier can be computed in polynomial time.
Mixed Problems. Extension of our approach to the case of goods is straightforward and is
simpler, both conceptually and in implementation than existing algorithms.
We expect that our approach generalizes to mixed problems (with goods and chores) as well.
Fair Assignment. In the fair assignment problem, the set of feasible allocations is restricted to
those that satisfy an additional “lottery” constraint: for any agent i ∈ [n] we have ∑j∈[m] zi,j = mn
(for n = m this means that each agent i receives a lottery on [m]). The competitive rule for fair
assignment was studied by [HZ79] and almost forty years later, the first algorithm was proposed
in [AJKT17] with the same performance as our algorithm for chores (polynomial in n for fixed m
and in m for fixed n).
The algorithm of [AJKT17] is based on the “black-box” of the cell enumeration technique, while
our approach could plausibly give an alternative explicit construction.
Other Constrained Economies. An economy with chores can be reduced to a constrained
economy with goods [BMSY17]: for each chore j introduce an auxiliary good j =“not doing j”;
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then there are n− 1 units of j while no agent can consume more than one unit. This suggests that
our approach may be applicable to computing the competitive rule in other constrained economies.
For example, agents may have individual caps on consumption of a particular item zi,j ≤ Ci,j
or may have caps on total consumption
∑
j∈[m] zi,j ≤ Ci. Computing competitive allocations in
these settings is an open problem, which perhaps can be attacked using our approach. The main
question is: can we compute the Pareto frontier in polynomial time for these constrained problems
like we do in Section 4?
Other applications. The technique of computing the Pareto frontier seems to be a useful
tool beyond applications to the competitive rule. It was recently used by [SSH19] to construct fair
Pareto optimal allocations with a minimal number of shared items.
In general, the approach could be used for building efficient algorithms, when a certain objective
function (e.g., social welfare or the number of shared goods) is to be minimized over the set of Pareto
optimal allocations under fairness constraints.
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A Characterization of competitive allocations
This auxiliary section starts from well-known characterization formulas relating competitive price
vectors and utilities (see [NRTV07] chapter 5, [BMSY18]). Using them, we derive three charac-
terizations of competitive allocations that do not involve prices: by a system of inequalities, as
maximizers of a linear objective, and as critical points of the Nash product. These results are
not new (proved in [BMSY18] for equal budgets), but since we use them throughout the paper
(Theorem 7 and Proposition 34), we present short proofs here for the convenience of the reader.
A.1 MPB property and formulas for equilibrium prices
At a competitive allocation z, the “demand” zi of an agent i maximizes his utility ui(zi) on a
budget constraint
∑m
j=1 pjzi,j ≤ bi. Therefore, she consumes only those chores that have minimal
disutility to price ratio |vi,j |/|pj | (the Minimal Pain per Buck property).
Formally, the first-order conditions for the individual demands imply the following characteri-
zation of competitive allocations.
Lemma 44. Fix v and b with strictly negative elements. A feasible allocation z is competitive for
a vector of prices p ∈ Rn<0 if and only if
• MPB condition: zi,j > 0⇒ vi,jpj ≤
vi,c
pc
for all chores c ∈ [m].
• Budget exhaustion: bi =
∑m
j=1 pjzi,j.
From this lemma one can easily deduce formulas for prices in terms of z and v.
Lemma 45. Consider a competitive allocation z for a division problem with matrix of values v
and a budget vector b having strictly negative elements. Then for any agent i and a chore j
• pj = vi,jbiui(zi) if zi,j > 0
• pj ≥ vi,jbiui(zi) if zi,j = 0.
Proof. By Lemma 44, agent i spends his budget bi on chores j with minimal |vi,j |/|pj |. Therefore
his utility ui(zi) = bi minj∈[m] |vi,j |/|pj |. Thus, ui(zi)/bi = |vi,j |/|pj | if zi,j > 0 and ui(zi)/bi ≤
|vi,j |/|pj |, otherwise.
As a corollary of Lemma 45, we see that for competitive allocations u(z) has strictly negative
components and that z and b together uniquely determine p.
A.2 Analog of the Eisenberg-Gale result and other characterizations
Proposition 46. Fix a matrix v and a vector of budgets b, both with strictly negative components,
and consider an allocation z. The following statements are equivalent:
1. the allocation z is competitive
2. (characterization by inequalities) u(z) has strictly negative components and zi,j > 0 implies
vi,jbi
ui(zi)
≥ vi′jbi′
ui′(zi′)
for all i′ ∈ [n]. (11)
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3. (variational characterization) u(z) has strictly negative components and y = z maximizes
the weighted utilitarian welfare Wτ (y) =
∑n
i=1 τiui(yi), where τi =
bi
ui(zi)
, over all feasible
allocations y.
4. (analog of the Eisenberg-Gale characterization) the vector u(z) has strictly negative compo-
nents, belongs to the Pareto frontier U∗, and is a critical point of the Nash product Nb on
U .
Proof. We will show that (1)⇔ (2), (2)⇔ (3), (3)⇔ (4).
• (1)⇔ (2): For competitive allocation z, inequalities (11) hold because by Lemma 45 we have
vi,jbi
ui(zi)
= pj ≥ vi
′jbi′
ui′(zi′)
.
In the opposite direction, if an allocation z satisfies (11) then we can define a “candidate”
price vector by
pj =
vi,jbi
ui(zi)
for an agent i that consumes a non-zero amount of j. Then (11) implies MPB conditions of
Lemma 44. The budget is exhausted since
m∑
j=1
pjzi,j =
m∑
j=1
vi,jbi
ui(zi)
zi,j =
bi
ui(zi)
m∑
j=1
vijzi,j = bi.
By Lemma 44, z is competitive.
• (2)⇔ (3): An allocation z maximizes the weighted utilitarian welfare Wτ if and only if each
chore j is given to an agent with minimal weighted disutility τi|vi,j |. Taking into account the
definition of τ , we see that these conditions are equivalent to a family of inequalities (11).
• (3)⇔ (4): The tangent hyperplane h to the level curve of Nb at u(z) is given by the equation
u′ : 〈u′, τ〉 = 〈u(z), τ〉 (indeed, τ is the gradient of ln(Nb) and thus is orthogonal to the level
curve). The hyperplane h supports U iff u = u(z) is either minimum or maximum of 〈u, τ〉.
The condition u(z) ∈ U∗ rules out the scenario with the minimum. Thus, u(z) is a critical
point of Nb on the Pareto frontier if and only if it maximizes 〈u, τ〉 over the feasible set U .
Rewriting this condition in terms of the allocation z, we get (3).
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